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MISSING THE MARK: AN OVERLOOKED STATUTE 
REDEFINES THE DEBATE OVER STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
William S. Blatt* 
Scholars have long debated the merits of various theories for interpret-
ing statutes.  On one side, textualists argue for close adherence to text.  On 
the other side are those who interpret statutes by reference to legislative in-
tent.1   
At the center of this debate is the seminal 1891 Supreme Court case 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.2  That case considered whether 
the Alien Contract Labor Act, which prohibited the importation of ―labor or 
service of any kind,‖3 barred a church from hiring an English minister.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Brewer consciously departed from statutory 
language and exempted the hiring.  Textualist and intentionalist interpreters 
alike regard Holy Trinity as a crucial test case for assessing theories of in-
terpretation.4  
Months before the Supreme Court‘s decision in Holy Trinity, however, 
Congress specifically excluded ministers from the Act.5  Remarkably, the 
debate gives scant attention to this exclusion.  The failure to consider such a 
highly relevant statute is no isolated mistake.  Rather, it reflects a larger 
blind spot in our thinking about statutory interpretation.  Continuing in 
three parts, this Essay explores the impact of the exclusion on that thinking. 
Part One describes Holy Trinity and its role in the legal literature.  Tex-
tualists, such as Justice Scalia and Professors Vermeule and Manning, at-





  Professor, University of Miami School of Law.   
1
  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). 
2
  143 U.S. 457 (1892) (link).  See Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Let-
ter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 907 (2000) (―[T]he meaning of the 
Holy Trinity Church case and its use of legislative history remains a significant element in the vigorous con-
temporary debate over statutory interpretation.‖). 
3
  Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332, superseded by Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 
ch. 1012, § 4, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214. 
4
  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Fetch Some 
Soupmeat”, 16 CARDOZO L.  REV. 2209, 2217 n.38 (1995) (―Church of the Holy Trinity has . . . been the 
focal point of the debate between the Supreme Court‘s ‗new textualists‘ and more purpose-based interpre-
ters.‖). 
5
  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. 
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Eskridge, Tribe, and Sunstein defend the result in the case, but not Justice 
Brewer‘s opinion, which has glaring weaknesses.   
Part Two argues that the subsequently enacted exception reveals Con-
gress‘s intent to exclude ministers from the original Alien Contract Labor 
Act.  Overlooked by current scholars, this argument remedies the weak-
nesses in Justice Brewer‘s opinion and was eventually adopted by the Su-
preme Court.  Contrary to scholarly opinion, the effective date of the 
subsequent statute permits this argument.  Congress did not bar using that 
statute as evidence of prior law.  
Part Three considers the wider implications of the overlooked argu-
ment.  Scholars ignore the subsequent statute because they are preoccupied 
with the choice between text and intent.  The subsequent statute reminds us 
that statutory interpretation often centers on another logically prior choice, 
one between competing texts.  That choice requires a richer description of 
the legislative process than any offered in the current debate. 
The Essay concludes by offering one such enriched description, one 
which acknowledges that legislation involves three distinct communities—
public, political, and policy—each with its own dynamics and role in the 
process.  The overlooked argument in Holy Trinity illustrates how this fuller 
description aids in choosing among statutes.  The ministers exception de-
served retroactive application because it reflected the unwavering opinion 
of the most influential community: the public at large.   
In the end, then, Holy Trinity acquires a very different meaning from 
that assigned to it by most scholars.  Once the subsequent statute is consi-
dered, the case no longer illustrates the choice between text and intention.  
At the same time, however, that statute makes Holy Trinity a powerful ex-
ample for a more fundamental and critical task—identifying the governing 
text.   
I. HOLY TRINITY AND CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP 
A. The Supreme Court Opinion 
In 1887, the Church of the Holy Trinity, located in New York City, 
contracted with E. Walpole Warren, an alien residing in England, to serve 
as its rector and pastor.  The next year, the United States district attorney 
brought an action against the church under the Alien Contract Labor Act of 
1885, which prohibited the importation of aliens to ―perform labor or ser-
vice of any kind.‖6  The Court of Appeals held that Holy Trinity had vi-
olated the Act, which covered ―[e]very kind of industry, and every 
employment, manual or intellectual.‖7   





  Alien Contract Labor Act § 1.   
7
  United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 305 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).   
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Justice Brewer conceded that the hiring fell within the statutory language,8 
but held that it was nonetheless legal because Congress could not have in-
tended to outlaw the employment of a minister.9  He held that ―however 
broad the language of the statute may be, the [Church‘s] act, although with-
in the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore can-
not be within the statute.‖10   
Justice Brewer offered two grounds for this holding.  His first was 
based on specific legislative intent: Congress only intended to regulate  ma-
nual labor, not professional services.11  This intent was evident in the title of 
the Act, which contained only the word ―labor,‖ suggesting a concern with 
only manual laborers, not professional or intellectual workers.12  Justice 
Brewer also found evidence of intent  in ―the evil [the statute was] designed 
to remedy‖—the immigration of ―great numbers of an ignorant and servile 
class of foreign laborers.‖13  Committee hearings were focused on ―cheap 
unskilled labor,‖14 and the House report mentioned workers ―from the low-
est social stratum.‖15  A final, ―singular circumstance, throwing light upon 
the intent of Congress,‖ was the report of the Senate Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor.16  That committee recognized that a court might apply the 
statutory language to professional services, but decided not to report an 
amendment excluding such services, or any amendments at all, ―believing 
that the bill in its present form will be construed as including only those 
whose labor or service is manual in character, and being very desirous that 
the bill become law before the adjournment.‖17 
Justice Brewer‘s second ground was based on religion‘s special place 
in America.18  Surveying a vast array of sources, including the commission 
granted Christopher Columbus, colonial charters, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the federal and state constitutions, and widespread social practic-
es,19 Justice Brewer concluded: ―[T]his is a Christian nation.‖20  He could 





  See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). 
9
  See id. at 459. 
10
  Id. at 472. 
11
  Id. at 463. 
12
  See id. at 463 (―No one reading such a title would suppose that Congress had in its mind any purpose 
of staying the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is of 
the brain.‖). 
13
  Id. (quoting United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (1886)). 
14
  Id. at 464. 
15
  Id. at 465 (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 5359 (1884)). 
16
  Id. at 464. 
17
  Id. (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 6059 (1884)). 
18
  Id. at 465. 
19
  Id. at 465–71. 
20
  Id.  
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hiring of a minister.21   
B. The Role of Holy Trinity In Current Scholarship 
Long after it was decided, Holy Trinity was regarded as an important 
case, both for its willingness to depart from text,22 and for its reliance on 
legislative history.23  In the last decade, however, Holy Trinity has assumed 
even greater importance in the midst of a raging debate over theories of sta-
tutory interpretation. 
1. Textualist Criticism 
Holy Trinity‘s prominence makes it an inviting target to textualists, 
who reject reliance on intent and legislative history.  The most prominent 
critic, Justice Scalia, directly challenges Justice Brewer‘s familiar rule.  In 
his essay Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, Justice Scalia 
presents Holy Trinity as ―the prototypical case involving the triumph of 
supposed ‗legislative intent‘ (a handy cover for judicial intent) over the text 
of the law.‖24  He rejects the decision as ―nothing but an invitation to judi-
cial lawmaking‖25 and concludes that ―[i]t is simply not compatible with 
democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that 
unelected judges decide what that is.‖26   
Following Justice Scalia‘s lead, other textualist scholars attack Holy 
Trinity.  Recognizing the case‘s pioneering use of legislative history,27 Pro-
fessor Vermeule claims that the Court misread the record,28 and that courts 





  Id. at 472 (―Can it be believed that [such an act] would have received a minute of approving thought 
or a single vote?‖). 
22
  See, e.g., Nat‘l Woodmark Mfrs. Ass‘n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967) (link); NLRB v. Fruit & 
Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964) (link). 
23
  Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Con-
struction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 401, 434 n.132 (1994). 
The leading treatise on statutory interpretation reversed its position on the use of legislative history after 
Holy Trinity was decided.  The 1891 edition of Sutherland‘s Statutory Interpretation disparaged the use of 
legislative history and made no specific reference to use of committee reports.  J.G. SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 300, at 383–84 (1891).  The 1904 edition, however, specifi-
cally stated that committee reports were ―proper sources of information in ascertaining the intent or mean-
ing of an act.‖  2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 470, at 880 (John Lewis 
ed., 2d ed. 1904) (citing Holy Trinity). 
24
  Scalia, supra note 4, at 18. 
25
  Id. at 21. 
26
  Id. at 22. 
27
  See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story 
of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1835 (1998) (―Holy Trinity elevated legislative history to 
new prominence by overturning the traditional rule that barred judicial recourse to internal legislative histo-
ry.‖).  
28
  Id. at 1837.  
29
  Id. at 1860. 
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ning singles out Holy Trinity as a leading example of the absurdity rule, 
which allows a court to reject a literal reading that yields absurd results.30  A 
relentless critic of this rule, Professor Manning finds the Supreme Court de-
cision to be a rare result that cannot be justified on other grounds.31 
2. Intentionalist Defenses 
Defenders of intentionalist interpretation rally around the Holy Trinity 
result.32  Agreeing with Justice Scalia that: ―Holy Trinity Church stands for 
the proposition that plain text can be trumped by contrary legislative histo-
ry, statutory purpose, and public values,‖33 Professor Eskridge explicitly 
draws upon normative considerations, such as the rule of lenity, the statuto-
ry purpose, and longstanding openness toward the immigration of profes-
sionals.34  In a similar vein, Professor Tribe argues that because the statute 
infringes upon the free exercise of religion, it should be read narrowly in 
accordance with the canon requiring that courts avoid constitutional is-
sues.35 
Professor Sunstein also supports Holy Trinity.  He offers three possible 
principles that justify departing from statutory language,36 and then argues 
that Justice Scalia‘s rebuttal of those principles is unconvincing.37  Finally, 
Professor Sunstein advocates a ―modern Holy Trinity,‖ under which agen-
cies would be allowed to go beyond text in interpreting statutes within their 
jurisdiction.38 
C. The Weaknesses of Justice Brewer’s Opinion 
The intentionalist defense of the Holy Trinity result does not extend to 
Justice Brewer‘s two arguments.  Intentionalists shy away from his claim 
that the legislative history showed that Congress intended to limit the sta-





  See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2403 (2003) (describing 
Holy Trinity as ―perhaps [the Supreme Court‘s] most influential absurdity decision‖). 
31
  See id. at 2462, 2463 n.275. 
32
  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 360–62 (1990) (praising Holy Trinity as a ―classic example‖ of practical reason-
ing).   
33
  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509, 1532 (1998) 
(reviewing SCALIA, supra note 4). 
34
  See id. at 1552–53. 
35
  See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 4, at 65, 92–93. 
36
  Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 542–43 (1997) (re-
viewing SCALIA, supra note 4) (general language shall not be used to reach a result that is absurd, ―clearly 
not intended by the enacting legislature,‖ or that ―depart[s] from longstanding social understandings and 
practices‖).  
37
  Id. at 549. 
38
  Id. at 552–53. 
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tive history does ―little work‖ in Holy Trinity.39  Even though Professor 
Chomsky finds that ministers were not part of the ―contract labor system‖ 
that troubled Congress, she nonetheless disagrees with Justice Brewer‘s 
reading of the legislative history.40  Intentionalists show even less interest in 
the Christian Nation argument.41   
The failure to defend the Supreme Court‘s opinion reflects weaknesses 
in Justice Brewer‘s arguments.  His claim that Congress intended to limit 
the Act to manual labor is unpersuasive.  The governing language (as op-
posed to the mere title of the Act)42 suggests broad application.  The Act 
contained limited exceptions for intellectual occupations,43 strongly suggest-
ing that its general rule applied broadly.44  Later congressional action also 
indicates a far-reaching intent.  In 1891, Congress added to the limited ex-
ceptions contained in the Act,45 and in 1903, it modified the statute to cover 
contracts to ―perform labor or service of any kind, skilled or unskilled,‖46 
definitively repudiating any claim that the statute was limited to manual la-
bor.47 
The textual evidence for a broad reading also finds support in the histo-
ry of the Act.  In fact, it was skilled laborers who initially pushed the legis-
lation.48  Unskilled laborers, represented by the Knights of Labor, joined the 
effort later.49  Moreover, a member of the House Labor Committee said that 





  Eskridge, supra note 33, at 1540.   
40
  Chomsky, supra note 2, at 927, 939. 
41
  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 682 (2001) (observing that current readers might be taken aback by Jus-
tice Brewer‘s Christian Nation argument and questioning whether the argument was critical to his opinion).  
42
  Cf. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND‘S STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:3, at 282 (7th ed. 2007) (noting that the use of titles to construe statutes is disfavored 
in Anglo-American law).  
43
  Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, § 5, 23 Stat. 332, 333 (―[N]or shall the provisions of this 
act apply to professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor to persons employed strictly as personal or 
domestic servants.‖). 
44
  See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 438 (1827) (―[T]he exception of a particular thing 
from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the lawgiver, the thing excepted would be within the gen-
eral clause had the exception not been made . . . .‖) (link). 
45
  See In re Ellis, 124 F. 637, 643 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y 1903) (―It would seem as if a much simpler 
amendment would have restricted the act to conform to the original intention of its framers, and it might be 
argued that this additional enumeration might be taken as an intimation that the words ‗labor and service of 
any kind‘ were used with a broad meaning.‖).   
46
  Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 4, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.  
47
  See Ellis, 124 F. at 643. 
48
  Glassworkers and other skilled craft unions were the first to lobby for the bill, and the bill‘s sponsor 
was the former president of the Coopers International Union, closely associated with craft unions.  See 
CHARLOTTE ERICKSON, AMERICAN INDUSTRY AND THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRANT 1860-1885, at 139–66 
(1957).  
49
  See id. 
50
  See 15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884) (statements of Rep. Adams and Rep. O‘Neill). 
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Finally, the Senate committee‘s assertion that Congress intended to 
limit the Act to manual labor seems to be pure posturing.  The committee‘s 
claim that a clarifying amendment would have delayed enactment is im-
plausible on its face.  A truly noncontroversial amendment does not delay 
legislation.  It can be adopted by a quick voice vote.  Furthermore, as Pro-
fessor Vermeule has shown, subsequent legislative history belies the com-
mittee‘s statement.  After its report to the full Senate, the bill moved slowly.  
Hoping to get a vote before adjournment, the floor manager offered several 
amendments, including an exception for intellectual services.51  His offer 
was unsuccessful, however, and the Senate adjourned without acting.  The 
bill was reintroduced the next session, this time with amendments, but not 
one exempting intellectual services.  The failure to offer an exemption, even 
with ample time, reveals that none was intended.  Indeed, in floor debate, 
the manager apparently agreed that the statute covered intellectual servic-
es.52  
Justice Brewer‘s second argument, that a Christian nation would not 
have prohibited hiring a minister, lacks any evidence connecting religious 
values to the Alien Contract Labor Act.  In the absence of such evidence, 
one cannot be sure how members of the 1885 Congress would have reacted 
to the issue.  Perhaps they would have resisted a ministers exception for 
fear of opening the doors to other exemptions.53  In the end, Justice Brew-
er‘s litany of sources for his conclusion are so far afield from the statute at 
issue that he seems to be substituting his views for those of Congress.54 
II. THE OVERLOOKED ARGUMENT: A SUBSEQUENT STATUTE 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED MINISTERS 
Given the importance of Holy Trinity, it is remarkable how little atten-
tion is given to a subsequent statute, enacted in 1891, prior to argument be-
fore the Supreme Court.  That statute specifically exempted from the Act 





  See Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1848–49. 
52
  Id.  The manager responded to the claim that the bill covered skilled laborers by saying, ―If that class 
of people are liable to become the subject-matter of [importation under contracts to labor], then the bill ap-
plies to them.‖  16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair).  For further discussion of this state-
ment, see Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1848–50. 
53
  See Manning supra note 30, at 2428 (noting that ―if the Senate proponents had supported significant 
new exceptions, such action might have led others to insist on even more exceptions, thereby reducing the 
bill‘s likelihood of enactment.‖).  
54
  Cf. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (cri-
ticizing Holy Trinity as ―rummag[ing] through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legisla-
tion in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more 
comfortable,‖ and concluding that ―[t]he problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the 
world whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice‖) (link). 
55
  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/36/ 154 
never mention the statute.  Others mention it only in passing.56   
A. A Powerful Rationale for the Court’s Decision 
On its face, the statute provides a persuasive argument for the Court‘s 
result.  The exemption was directly inspired by the Circuit Court opinion 
below,57 which was discussed in committee hearings58 and mentioned on the 
house floor.59  Congress disagreed with the decision below and considerable 
authority supports applying such statutes retroactively.60 
In fact, this argument is more powerful than either offered by the 
Court.  It eliminates the need for a broad intellectual services exception by 
narrowing the holding to ministers, a result closer to probable congressional 
intent.  Furthermore, reliance on the ministers exception grounds Justice 
Brewer‘s claim that Congress could not have intended to penalize the hiring 
of clergy.  One need not invoke distant sources or abstract principles to 
support his claim; the 1891 statute provided direct evidence of popular be-
liefs regarding the importation of ministers.   
Not only does the overlooked argument improve upon Justice Brewer‘s 
opinion in the case; it also finds support in subsequent judicial authority.  
Four years after its decision in Holy Trinity, in United States v. Laws,61 the 
Supreme Court used the exceptions enacted in 1891 as evidence of original 
statutory meaning. In considering whether the 1885 statute prohibited im-
portation of a chemist, the Court did not confine itself to the language 
enacted in 1885 but also applied, without discussion, a later enacted excep-
tion for ―persons belonging to any recognized profession.‖62   
B. The Effective Date 





  Professor Eskridge gives the statute limited consideration. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 1534, 
1538, 1548. 
57
  See United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 265 (1895) (observing that the exemption was probably 
enacted as a result of the Circuit Court opinion) (link). 
58
  See H.R. REP. NO. 51,3472, at 91 (1890) (Statement of Samuel Gompers, President of the American 
Federation of Labor) (describing the prosecution of Holy Trinity Church as part of an effort ―to bring the 
law into odium and ridicule, and cause a revulsion of feeling among the citizens and secure [the Act‘s] re-
peal‖). 
59
  In explaining an exemption for ―ministers of the gospel‖ in an earlier version of the bill, Representa-
tive Buchanan, the bill‘s floor manager, observed that under the 1885 Act, ―a minister of the gospel, coming 
to New York, under engagement to serve a church in that city, was held to come within the prohibition . . . 
.‖  21 CONG. REC. 9439 (1890). 
60
  See NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.36 at 412–
23 (6th ed., 2002 rev.) (recognizing that an amendment affecting substantive rights may apply retroactively 
―[w]here a statute . . . is remedial in nature [and] . . . the legislative intent indicates that reotractive oper-
ation is intended.‖). 
61
  163 U.S. 258. 
62
  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085.  See Laws, 163 U.S. at 266–68.  
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prior to its enactment.63  In particular, they point to § 12 of that Act, which 
contained a ―savings clause‖ explicitly preserving prior law for pending 
cases.64  Professor Vermeule argues that this ―unusually pointed nonretroac-
tivity provision‖ forecloses drawing any inference from the ministers ex-
ception,65 a proposition with which Professors Eskridge and Chomsky 
agree.66   
These scholars correctly recognize that the subsequent statute did not 
control in Holy Trinity.  Section 13 made that statute effective after March 
1891.67  Under common law, the effect of a statute on private actions occur-
ring prior to the date of enactment depended upon whether the statute 
amended or repealed prior law; amendments applied prospectively,68 but re-
peals, at least of criminal statutes, applied retroactively.69  In 1871, howev-
er, Congress revised the common law rule and enacted a general savings 
clause, which preserved any ―penalty, forfeiture or liability‖ arising under 
prior law.70  Thus, by the time of the Holy Trinity decision, it was clear that 
the subsequent statute formally governed only contracts entered into after 
1891. 
Even if not controlling, however, the 1891 statute can still be used as 
evidence of the meaning of the original Act.71  Section 12 does not preclude 
such use.  In fact, it is absurd to apply § 12 to the ministers exception.  Such 
application distinguishes between defendants who were indicted prior to the 
enactment of the 1891 Act and those who were indicted after—churches 
hiring ministers between 1885 and 1891 would be subject to different subs-
tantive law depending upon the date of indictment.  It is irrational to deny 





  See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 1548 n.141 (―The amendment was by its terms not retroactive.‖). 
64
  § 12, 26 Stat. at 1086 (providing that ―nothing contained in this act shall be construed to affect any 
prosecution or other proceeding, criminal or civil, begun under any existing act or any acts hereby amended, 
but such prosecutions or other proceedings, shall proceed as if this act had not been passed‖). 
65
  Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1842 n.38.  According to Professor Vermeule, such an inference ―would 
itself have violated the 1891 statute.‖  Id.  
66
  Professors Eskridge and Chomsky both cite § 12 for the proposition that the ministers exception was 
prospective only, not affecting pending prosecutions.  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 938 & n.183; Es-
kridge, supra note 33, at 1534, 1538. 
67
  § 13, 26 Stat. at 1086.  
68
  See SINGER, supra note 60, § 22.36, at 412 (―[I]t is presumed that provisions added by [an] amend-
ment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate prospectively.‖).  
69
  See Elmer M. Million, Expiration or Repeal of a Federal or Oregon Statute or Regulation as a Bar 
to Prosecution for Violations Thereunder, 24 ORE. L. REV. 25, 27–31 (1944). 
70
  Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 432.  (―[T]he repeal of any statute shall not have the 
effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the re-
pealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the 
purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or 
liability.‖).  
71
  See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (finding a later enacted exception ―declaratory of 
the true meaning and sense of the statute‖) (link). 
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simply because they had been indicted. 
This absurdity is avoided once one appreciates the larger statutory 
structure.  As noted above, by 1891, Congress had enacted ―a general sav-
ings clause‖72 that preserved substantive rights.  The only purpose § 12 
could therefore serve was as a special savings clause, preserving procedural 
rights. This savings clause supplemented and complemented the general 
savings clause enacted in 1871. 
The legislative history supports this reading.  Early versions of the 
1891 Act contained a ministers exception, but no savings clause.73  That 
clause was added only later, along with other procedural changes74 that be-
came the main focus of the final Act.75  In 1882, Congress had created a 
system of dual authority for immigration76—the Secretary of the Treasury 
wrote the rules and then contracted with states, which enforced them.77  The 
1891 Act repealed this system and entrusted enforcement to the Superinten-
dent of Immigration, who appointed federal inspectors78 with authority over 
the immigration laws.79   
Procedural changes were unaffected by the general savings clause and, 
under common law, applied to pending cases.80  To the extent that the pro-
cedural changes made in 1891 simply strengthened enforcement, however, 
such retrospective application was unnecessary and impinged upon state au-
tonomy.  More stringent enforcement could be limited to new cases, while 
allowing those already in the judicial pipeline to proceed without disrup-





  See SINGER, supra note 60, § 22.36, at 418–25.  
73
  See H.R. REP. NO. 51-3808, at 1–2 (1891) (accompanying H.R. 58, 51st Cong. (1891)); H.R. REP. 
NO. 2997, at 1, 2 (1890) (accompanying H.R. 9632, 51st Cong. (1889)), 21 CONG. REC. 9437–38 (1889); 
H.R. 12209, 51st Cong. § 1 (1890). 
74
  See H.R. REP. NO. 51-3807, at 2–6 (1891) (accompanying H.R. 13586, 51st Cong. (1891)); H.R. 
REP. NO. 51-3472, at 94–96 (1891) (accompanying H.R. 13175, 51st Cong. (1891)); S. 5035, 51st Cong. §§ 
5, 7 (1891); H.R. REP. NO. 51-280 (1890) (accompanying H.R. 578, 51st Cong. (1890)); H.R. 12298, 51st 
Cong. § 19 (1890). 
75
  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 935 n.169 (noting that the 1891 act ―focused primarily on strengthen-
ing the enforcement of the Alien Contract Labor Act in the face of complaints that the collectors of customs 
were generally unable to detect violations‖).  
76
  See H.R. REP. NO. 51-3807, at 2–4 (1891) (criticizing dual authority and recommending creation of a 
superintendent of immigration); H.R. REP. NO. 51-3808, at 2–4 (1891) (accompanying H.R. 58, 51st Cong. 
(1891).  
77
  Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. 
78
  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 (establishing the office of superintendent of 
immigration). 
79
  Id. § 8, at 1086. 
80
  See SINGER, supra note 60, § 22.36, at 418 (stating that ―provisions added by [an] amendment that 
affect procedural rights—legal remedies—are construed to apply to all cases pending at the time of its 
enactment‖). 
81
  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 936 n.172 (suggesting that the nonretroactivity clause may have been 
included ―simply to avoid disrupting the already criticized efforts at enforcing the statute‖). 
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future cases only.82 
Subsequent case law confirms this reading.  Courts construing similar 
clauses have consistently refused to apply them to changes in substantive 
law.  Such was the conclusion of a divided court of appeals that considered 
whether a savings clause contained in a later immigration statute repealed 
the general savings clause.83  This conclusion became firmly established in 
cases construing similar language in the Hepburn Act.  In those cases, the 
defendant claimed that a special savings clause retroactively repealed the 
substantive statute for persons not yet indicted.  The courts noted the absur-
dity of treating indicted persons more harshly than the unindicted84 and ap-
plied the clause only to procedural provisions contained in the Hepburn 
Act.85 
III. THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE OVERLOOKED ARGUMENT 
A. Preoccupation with the Choice Between Text and Intent 
Early scholars who missed the subsequent statute were likely misled by 
the Supreme Court opinion.  Surprisingly, Justice Brewer did not even cite 
the 1891 statute.86  The simplest explanation for this omission is ignorance: 





  Section 12 was added to the bill along with the repeal of dual authority.  Compare H.R. 12209 (Dec. 
1, 1890), with H.R. 12298, §§ 8, 19 (Dec. 3, 1890) (creating superintendent office and adding savings 
clause).  Also compare H.R. 58, with H.R. 13586, §§ 7, 8, 12 (creating superintendent office and adding 
savings clause), and 22 CONG. REC. 3183–85 (Feb. 23, 1891). 
83
  Lang v. United States, 133 F. 201, 203–05 (7th Cir. 1904). 
84
  See, e.g., Great No. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 469 (1908) (noting that the inclusion of 
the special savings clause was not ―the result of a purpose on the part of Congress [ ] to distinguish without 
reason between pending causes by saving one class and destroying the other‖) (link); United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 148 F. 719, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1907) (―[I]t is inconceivable that the Congress of the United States . 
. . could possibly have gotten into such a frame of mind that they would divide all prior offenders into two 
classes, and say that those who had been indicted should be punished, and those who, up to that time, had 
avoided the grand jury, should be pardoned.  For Congress to do such a thing would be both absurd and un-
just.‖); United States v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 151 F. 84, 97 (D. Minn. 1907); United States v. 
Delaware, L.& W. R. Co. 152 F. 269, 275 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907); United States v. New York Cent. & H. 
R.R. Co., 153 F. 630, 630 (D.C.N.Y. 1907). 
85
  See Great No. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. at 467 (explaining that ―the legislative mind was concerned with the 
confusion and uncertainty which might be begotten from applying the new remedies to causes then pending 
in the courts,‖ and that ―this subject, and this subject alone, was the matter with which the provision in 
question was intended to deal‖); id. at 467–68 (―[T]he provision as to pending causes was solely addressed 
to the remedies to be applied in the future carrying on of such cases.‖); id. at 469 (observing that the inclu-
sion of the special savings clause ―was solely based on the desire of Congress not to interfere with proceed-
ings then pending in courts, but to leave such proceedings to be carried to a finality, in accordance with the 
remedies existing at the time of their initiation‖). 
86
  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 938 (―[I]t is curious that an enactment bearing so precisely on the is-
sue of congressional purpose was completely ignored by both court and litigants.‖). 
87
  Id. (―Although the exemption for ministers was enacted almost a full year before the Holy Trinity 
Church case was argued at the Supreme Court, it appears that the amendment was not brought to the atten-
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the statute, and, in fact, they drew inferences from congressional inaction in 
1888.88  Ignorance is also consistent with the explanation later offered in 
Laws, in which the Court stated that its review in Holy Trinity ―was had 
upon the record based upon the act as originally passed.‖89  Apparently, the 
1891 Act would have been relevant had it been in the record. 
But ignorance does not explain why today‘s scholars slight the 1891 
statute.  Here, the most likely explanation is that the subsequent statute does 
not serve their purpose.  Holy Trinity is no longer ―the prototypical case in-
volving the triumph of supposed ‗legislative intent,‘‖90 if there is a statute 
squarely addressing the issue.  Thus, scholars‘ preoccupation with the 
choice between text and intent skews their presentation of Holy Trinity. 
At the same time, the fixation on this choice affects their view of legis-
lation.  Statutory interpretation necessarily entails a view of the legislative 
process,91 and each side of the debate has its preferred perspective.92  Tex-
tualists tend to view the legislature as simply a device for aggregating pri-
vate interests.93  Such a device often malfunctions.94  Some interests, 
particularly those which are large and diffuse, are underrepresented.95  In-
tentionalists, by contrast, attribute greater rationality to the legislature.  The 
leading advocates of purposive interpretation, Hart and Sacks, posit that the 
legislature is ―made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.‖96  Drawing upon civic republicanism, Professor Sunstein treats 
legislation as a ―deliberative process[]‖.97 
When presented in a polarized debate, these perspectives appear mu-
                                                                                                                           
tion of the Justices when they deliberated . . . .‖). 
88
  See Brief for the United States at 7–8, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 
(1892) (No. 13,166) (claiming that it was ―remarkable that Congress did not make the meaning of the law 
clearer‖ in statutory amendments enacted in 1888 if the Circuit Court decision ―did such violence to the in-
tention of Congress‖). 
89
  United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 265 (1896).  
90
  Scalia, supra note 4, at 18. 
91
  See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1597, 1642 (1991). 
92
  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statu-
tory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 275–77 (1988) (associating deference to legislative intention with a 
view of government as reasonable persons acting reasonably and arguing that the public choice vision of the 
legislative process undermines an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation). 
93
  See, e.g., id. at 277.  
94
  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 302 n.37 (2006) (arguing that ―background intentions and purposes are always subject to 
being narrowed or broadened by the compromises, concessions, and deals brokered in the legislative 
process‖).  
95
  For example, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Justice Scalia defended a 
textualist interpretation by pointing to the organizational difficulties faced by white men.  480 U.S. 616, 677 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (link). 
96
  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (tent. ed. 1958). 
97
  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1584 (1988).   
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tually exclusive.  Statutes either advance private interests or the common 
good, but not both.98  The result is an impoverished account of the legisla-
tive process and the statutes it produces. 
B. The Choice Between Competing Texts 
The 1891 statute serves as a reminder that statutory interpretation in-
volves more than a choice between text and intent.  Courts often face anoth-
er choice: one between competing texts.  Holy Trinity involved two such 
choices.  Most obvious is the choice between the original Alien Contract 
Labor Act, which likely covered ministers, and the 1891 amendment, which 
plainly excluded them.  Less obvious is the choice between the general ef-
fective date contained in § 13 of the 1891 Act and the special savings clause 
contained in § 12 of that Act.  Applying the general effective date permits 
the Court to draw a positive inference from the ministers exception, while 
applying the special savings clause blocks that inference. 
The question of which text applies is, in a sense, more fundamental 
than the choice between text and intent.  The latter choice cannot arise until 
one has identified the governing texts.  Textualists and intentionalists alike 
must first determine which statutes are relevant.  This determination re-
quires a richer account of the legislative process than those offered in the 
current debate.  One cannot readily assign weight to competing statutory 
provisions if one regards the legislature in black-and-white terms—as solely 
a malfunctioning machine, or solely a rational actor.  What is needed is an 
account that sorts out the mix of private interests and public goods ad-
vanced by statutes. 
C. A Richer Description of the Legislative Process 
One such description99 regards the legislature as a diverse institution 





  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 TermForeword: The Court and the Econom-
ic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1985) (distinguishing between general-interest laws, deserving a broad 
reading, from private-interest laws, which should be narrowed).  Judge Posner offers more refined catego-
ries.  See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 263, 269–272 (1982) (dividing statutes between ―public interest defined economically,‖ ―pub-
lic interest in other senses,‖ ―public sentiment,‖ and ―narrow interest group legislation‖). 
99
  This analysis draws on John Kingdon‘s work, which identified three separate streamspolicy, polit-
ical, and problemfeeding into governmental decisions.  See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, 
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 92 (1984).  Kingdon‘s problem stream consists of value judgments 
drawn from the larger culture.  See id. at 116.  See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as Institution, 
34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1934) (analyzing the ―working Constitution‖ by reference to ―specialists in go-
verning,‖ ―interested groups,‖ and the ―general public‖).   
100
  See William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 
95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 641–49 (2001).  See also STANLEY FISH, Change, in DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141, 
141 (1989) (describing an interpretive community as ―not so much a group of individuals who shared a 
point of view but a point of view or way of organizing experience that shared individuals‖). 
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thor of, and audience for, statutes.  We can distinguish three distinct com-
munities, each with its own decisionmaking process and role in the 
tive process.101   
The first community, the public community,102 consists of society at 
large, persons lacking a special role in government.  The public community 
is the largest and most heterogeneous community.  It does not engage in ex-
tended analysis, but instead reacts to images and symbols.  Its members 
know little about the legislative details.  
The second community is the political community.  This community 
consists of elected politicians and their consultants.  Members of this com-
munity comprise the most visible actors in government: the President and 
administration, political appointees, members of Congress, and political 
parties.  The political community reaches consensus through bargaining and 
voting rather than persuasion.  Responding to electoral, partisan or pressure 
group factors, politicians reach out to voters, debate opposing politicians, 
and court interest groups.  Members of the political community trade provi-
sions, build coalitions, and compromise.103   
The third community, the policy community, consists of professionals 
with specialized substantive knowledge.  The hidden actors in government, 
members of the policy community form separate subcommunities around 
different subjects.  The legal profession itself is one policy subcommunity, 
in which lawyers and judges cultivate specialized knowledge.104  Sharing 
specialized training, the policy community strives for consensus though 
reasoned argument. 
Each community plays a distinctive role in legislation.105  The public 
community exerts the greatest influence over the agenda, the list of subjects 
that command governmental attention.106  Exercising its influence through 
polls and elections, the public community forms the backdrop against which 





  These communities reflect familiar views but do not exist in pure form.  See Llewellyn, supra note 
99, at 21 n.32 (1934) (―[T]he marking off of ‗an interest,‘ ‗a group,‘ ‗an institution‘ is an artificial abstrac-
tion from a complexly concrete mass of phenomena . . . [and] the boundaries drawn will always be inde-
fensible, save for as they become useful and significant for the purpose in hand.‖).   
102
  Kingdon‘s ―problem stream‖ is formed largely by judgments from society at large.  See KINGDON, 
supra note 99, at 115. 
103
  See KINGDON, supra note 99, at 152–172. 
104
  Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Non-Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y. 87, 88 (1994) (arguing that ―American law cannot be reduced to any other discipline, nor can legal 
analysis be reduced to any other methodology‖). 
105
  Passage of legislation involves all three communities.  See KINGDON, supra note 99, at 211. 
106
  See KINGDON, supra note 99, at 3 (distinguishing agenda setting from alternative specification). 
107
  See Llewellyn, supra note 99, at 19 (noting that the public plays a role like that of a theater au-
dience). 
108
  See KINGDON supra note 99, at 95–121.  A condition becomes a problem only if there is a shared 
cultural judgment that something must be done.  A focusing event—a disaster, crisis, or powerful symbol—
provides the occasion for expressing this judgment.  See also ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, 
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political community exerts some influence on both the agenda and the pro-
posed solutions to the problem.  That community sharpens and resolves dif-
ferences of opinion within the society at large.  The policy community has 
the greatest influence over the details of legislative proposals.  This com-
munity drafts legislation109 and administers statutes.  Thus, the communities 
form a chain of authority, in which the people delegate authority to politi-
cians, who in turn delegate the details to policy professionals.110 
The views of the communities display varying degrees of stability.  
Except in rare constitutional moments,111 public beliefs change slowly.  The 
policy community‘s views evolve predictably according to agreed-upon 
methods of reasoning.  By contrast, the views of the political community 
are far less stable.  The voting process through which it expresses its opi-
nions is highly sensitive to historical conditions.112  
D. Using the Description to Choose Among Statutes 
This interpretive community account of the legislative process has two 
implications for choosing among statutes.  First, it indicates that an interpre-
ter trying to replicate the legislative, or indeed any governmental, process 
should give greater weight to the community with the greatest impact on the 
agenda.  Thus, an interpreter should look first to the public perspective.  If 
the public has no opinion on the issue presented, the interpreter should look 
to the political community, and if that community also lacks an opinion, to 
the policy community. 
Second, the interpretive community account indicates that retroactive 
application of a law depends upon the stability of the community‘s views.  
Retroactivity is plausible for statutes emanating from the public and policy 
communities because the views of those communities change slowly if at 
all.  Retroactivity is far less plausible for provisions reflecting a decision of 
the political community, which is highly dependent on the circumstances 
surrounding enactment.  The sensitivity of a political compromise to histor-
ical conditions makes it uncertain whether a later statute reflects a prior po-
                                                                                                                           
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA BUILDING 172–173 (2d ed. 1983) 
(―Policy problems are socially constructed.  They arise not so much from events and circumstances as from 
the meanings that people attribute to events and circumstances.‖). 
109
  Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990) (―Virtually no members of 
Congress draft their own legislation.  Rather, that task is left to committee staff, the Office of Legislative 
Counsel, or lobbyists.‖). 
110
  See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
845, 859 (1992) (stating that the legislative process ―requires each legislator to rely on staff, in the first in-
stance, to separate the matters that are significant from those that are not; it requires each legislator to make 
decisions about, and to resolve with other legislators, each significant matter; and it requires each legislator 
further to rely upon drafters and negotiators to carry out the legislator‘s decisions‖). 
111
  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991).   
112
  See Blatt, supra note 100, at 638 & n.55 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/36/ 162 
litical deal.  
This overlooked argument illustrates how the richer description can be 
used to choose among statutes.  The ministers exception arose from the 
public community.  In America, religion is an important public value, pro-
tected by the Constitution.  Thus, the public quality of the issue is evident in 
the briefs, which argued that application of the statute to ministers was un-
constitutional.113
 
 It is also evident in Justice Brewer‘s citation of canonical 
texts114 and the wide newspaper coverage given the case.115   
By contrast, the question of whether the 1885 Act extended beyond 
manual labor was highly political.  Immigration statutes pit interest groups 
against one another.  Workers seeking job protection battle employers seek-
ing cheap labor.  Within this larger battle are skirmishes that favor some in-
dustries at the expense of others.  In 1885, opponents of the Act offered 
exemptions that would dilute its impact, and Congress engaged in horse 
trading among various industries—discussing various exceptions116 before 
finally settling on the five ultimately enacted.   
The ministers exception reflects a widespread agreement that tran-
scended this political battle.117  The instigator of the action against the 
church, John Stewart Kennedy, did not want to bar the hiring of foreign mi-
nisters.  In fact, he agreed to reimburse the Church for any fine ultimately 
imposed.118  Kennedy‘s hope was that public outcry over barring the hiring 
of ministers would make the entire 1885 Act an object of ridicule and cause 
its repeal.119  The same dynamic existed in Congress.  The ministers excep-





Brief for the United States at 7–8, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) 
(No. 13,166).   
114
  In another work, I argue that Justice Brewer‘s opinion is a seminal case in the tradition of reading 
statutes in accordance with public opinion.  See William S. Blatt, A Neglected Tradition: Holy Trinity 
Church and Popular Statutory Interpretation (on file with author). 
115
  See, e.g., Importing a Rector, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1887, at 2 (link); The Imported Minister, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1887, at 8 (link); The Right to Import Rectors, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 1, 1892, at 2.   
116
  Senator Morgan suggested extending the exceptions to ―painters, sculptors, engravers, or other art-
ists, farmers, farm laborers, gardeners, orchardists, herders, farriers, druggists and druggists‘ clerks, 
shopkeepers, clerks, book-keepers, or any person having special skill in any business, art, trade or profes-
sion.‖  16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885).  Also, Senator Coke proposed an exception for ―agricultural‖ and 
―stock-raising‖ laborers.  Id. at 1788.   
117
  Even the Circuit Court below doubted that Congress intended to apply the statute to ministers.  See 
United States v. Rector of the Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 304 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) (―[I]t would 
not be indulging a violent supposition to assume that no legislative body in this country would have advi-
sedly enacted a law framed to cover a case like the present.‖). 
118
  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 910 (noting that ―[t]he suit was an entirely friendly one,‖ and that 
Kennedy, if he won the case, would pay the $1,000 fine imposed (quoting The Right to Import Rectors, su-
pra note 115, at 2)). 
119
  See Importing a Rector, supra note 115, at 2 (―[M]y only object  . . . is . . . to make this a test case, 
and by enforcing a most obnoxious and unreasonable law I hope thereby it will lead to its total abrogation.‖ 
(quoting John Stewart Kennedy)).  See Chomsky, supra note 2, at 910–11. 
120
  See supra note 58 (describing Samuel Gompers‘ testimony).  
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The amendment was viewed as strengthening the Act, not weakening it.  
The exception passed easily; the only question was whether to limit it to 
ministers of the gospel or extend it to those of other denominations.121 
Thus, the ministers exception did not result from horse trading.  The 
suit was not initiated by an American minister threatened by foreign compe-
tition, nor was the statute pushed by churches seeking cheap labor.  Rather, 
the exception reflected overriding social consensus.  The ministry is not 
simply one more guild.  Even today, most Americans agree that we are a 
―Christian nation.‖122   
None of these conclusions are altered by the savings clause.  The pub-
lic and political communities pay little attention to the effect of legislation 
on pending cases.123  That issue falls into the domain of lawyers, who rou-
tinely inserted similar language into a wide array of statutes.124  Thus, § 12 
simply does not bear upon the substantive decision reached by the public 
community. 
CONCLUSION 
The preoccupation with the choice between textualist and intentionalist 
theories of interpretation creates blind spots in the scholarship on statutory 
interpretation.  At the level of case analysis, it causes scholars to slight the 
subsequent statute in Holy Trinity.  At a broader level, this preoccupation 
causes them to neglect the more fundamental choice between competing 
texts.  Resolving this choice requires a description of the legislature that is 
richer than that found in the debate over textualism and intentionalism.  One 
such account recognizes that the legislature consists of three separate inter-
pretive communities, each displaying a different level of stability and play-
ing a distinct role in the legislative process.  Holy Trinity itself nicely 







  See 22 CONG. REC. 2955 (1891). 
122
  See Daniel Stone, One Nation Under God?, NEWSWEEK.COM, Apr. 7, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/192915 (noting that 62% of Americans consider the United States to be a 
―Christian nation‖) (link). 
123
  For example, prior to the enactment of the general savings clause, defendants often escaped pu-
nishment, ―because the legislature, in the hurry and confusion of amending and enacting statutes, had for-
gotten to insert a clause to save offenses and liabilities already committed or incurred from the effect of 
express or implied repeals.‖  United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 254, 255 (D. Or. 1877). 
124
  As the Supreme Court later said, ―These provisions, though differing in their terms, manifested an 
intention on the part of Congress to save rights which had accrued under prior laws.‖  United States v. Me-
nasche, 348 U.S. 528, 532 (1955) (link).  See Millard H. Ruud, The Savings ClauseSome Problems in 
Construction and Drafting, 33 TEX. L. REV. 285 (1955). 
